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Providing basic services under siege: preliminary insights from interim councils and medical 
providers in besieged urban areas of Syria 
 
CHAS MORRISON 
 
 
ABSTRACT  The interim councils and medical workers operating in besieged cities in opposition-
held areas of Syria have faced enormous challenges in providing services to citizens. Despite the 
extremely difficult operating environment, some semblance of organized government has been 
installed by anti-regime rebels, whose functions include provision of basic services. Data collected 
from interviews with interim councils and medical workers in four opposition-held areas suggest that 
despite the acutely constrained environment and overwhelming challenges, governance structures 
there demonstrate a degree of success in delivering basic services to civilian populations. Their 
provision of basic services constitutes more than a bargaining tool or legitimacy signalling, and is 
better understood as an integral part of revolutionary struggle. Although producing an objective 
picture of events on the ground is hindered by the conflict conditions and heavy propaganda, the 
Syrian experience of service provision under siege merits further exploration and has relevance for 
other conflict environments. 
 
KEYWORDS  basic services / conflict / local government / siege / Syria 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
There is a lack of empirical research on how local authorities, or any de facto government, provide 
basic services to civilian populations under the extreme conditions of urban siege. This paper is based 
on data from interviews with interim council and medical staff in four besieged urban areas in 
opposition-held territory in Syria. This data was originally collected in 2016 for a separate research 
project(1) investigating first responders and civilian protection practices. This current paper is a 
preliminary exploration of the provision of basic services to civilian populations undertaken by the 
alternative forms of sub-national government that have emerged in Syria’s besieged cities. The work 
environment is probably the most dangerous and challenging in the world at present. In addition to 
frequent aerial bombing and use of proscribed weapons such as gas, these urban areas experience 
mass displacements of civilians; lack of food, fuel and water; and severe damage to infrastructure. 
There are critical shortages of materials and minimal access for international humanitarian agencies. 
The state of siege in Syrian cities has been prolonged and unparalleled, and the inhabitants have 
suffered the worst humanitarian deprivations of any population in modern times.(2) 
In 2016, when our data were gathered, the Syrian opposition comprised various groups, some 
now defunct. Of the opposition groups, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and 
Opposition Forces (commonly known as the Syrian National Coalition – SNC) was the most 
significant. This umbrella group claimed to be the sole legitimate governing body for the opposition, 
but was based in exile in Turkey. The SNC established the Syrian Interim Government and the so-
called interim Local Councils, which undertake some government responsibilities, such as education, 
healthcare and emergency relief in opposition territories. However, the lack of a centrally controlled 
political entity complicates governance and service delivery. As well, the political affiliations of the 
Local Councils fluctuate and their democratic underpinnings are somewhat rudimentary, as typically 
only the President and Vice-President of each council are elected.(3)  
Many Local Council staff take seriously their responsibility to assist civilians. Revolutionary 
idealism appears to be a significant motivating factor as they consider this an integral aspect of their 
struggle against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. The relations between these quasi-governmental 
offices and armed groups are contentious, overlapping and shifting, and there is no international 
agreement on how to distinguish an armed actor from an interim government worker. One result is a 
lack of international consensus on how to engage these interim councils, to support service provision, 
or even to provide humanitarian assistance, to civilians in rebel-held areas.  
Within the besieged urban areas, the coordination and delivery of basic services are 
challenging for a variety of reasons: isolated geographical areas and blockades, lack of connection 
between different opposition-held territories, intermittent communications and financial support, 
destroyed or damaged infrastructure, and power struggles between armed groups. The overwhelming 
need for basic services is complicated by ad hoc implementation and a lack of planning. Under these 
circumstances, the distinction between basic services and emergency humanitarian relief becomes 
blurred. For example, under non-conflict conditions, the provision of emergency shelter or the 
clearance of rubble would not be considered a basic service, but in besieged cities these are a 
fundamental aspect of the work.  
The interim councils appear to operate with a large degree of autonomy. Their staff often 
present themselves as legitimate alternatives to the regime, with associations of service, resistance and 
sacrifice. They generally receive nominal salaries and some work as volunteers. The work 
environment necessitates close engagement with a wide range of stakeholders: armed groups, Civil 
Defence (the White Helmets), volunteers, local faith-based organizations, and other interim 
government offices and hospitals. The experiences within besieged Syrian cities provide insight into 
basic service delivery under extreme conditions. The international debate regarding support to 
alternative forms of local government in Syria for basic services, or any other type of support, has so 
far proved intractable. How external support can be provided is a separate question from whether it 
should be provided. In any case, interim councils and other non-state service providers operate with 
little consolidated international support, and what support they receive is highly politicized. 
The opinions and experiences of government and medical respondents, presented here in their 
own words,(4) convey the lived realities and challenges of service delivery during siege. While conflict 
conditions prevent research methods as rigorous as the research team would like, obtaining the 
opinions of service providers in situ is a valuable endeavour that outweighs concerns about the 
paucity of data and lack of triangulation. Due to the research challenges, the findings reported in this 
paper are considered indicative and preliminary.  
This paper is presented in eight sections. Following this introduction (I), an overview of 
relevant literature (II) and data collection methods (III) situates this research with respect to previous 
studies. The main body of the paper examines aspects of service provision (IV), inter-agency 
coordination mechanisms (V), specific challenges identified by respondents (VI), and the changes 
they would like to see in their work (VII). The conclusion (VIII) draws out some key themes 
emerging from the interviews. It suggests that service provision for war-affected populations should 
be more rigorously distinguished from mechanisms for cessation of political conflict. 
 
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON SERVICE PROVISION IN CONFLICT AND SIEGE 
 
Siege is an extreme form of combat: described by Smith as “a process of political domination aimed 
at isolating an entire population as a means of imposing collective punishment on ordinary people”.(5) 
Living conditions under siege are an understudied aspect of modern conflict, and existing studies 
often focus on psychological wellbeing or emergency humanitarian relief. Less research has been 
done on the coordination and delivery of basic services in such conditions. Syria is the most relevant 
case for examining this, but research there is hampered by problems of access and insecurity. 
This paper’s discussion employs the term “state”, although “quasi-state” or “nominal state” 
would be more accurate. Syria cannot be categorized simply as a failed or fragile state, and has 
descended into what de Rivero labels a “chaotic ungovernable entity”.(6) Significant (mostly urban) 
parts of the country are now territories where political authority is contested by various non-sovereign 
entities, including political wings of domestic armed groups and a range of international fighters. The 
term “fragile state” has been described as referring to “states that are unable and/or unwilling to fulfil 
basic governance functions”.(7) Many opposition-held parts of Syria, on the contrary, appear both able 
and willing to undertake some measures of service delivery, as well as other functions of government. 
This moves the debate far beyond discussions of greed and grievance as motives for rebel activity.(8) 
The evidence base regarding service provision in fragile and conflict-affected environments is 
generally scarce and lacking in rigour.(9) While there have been no objective assessments of service 
provision activities of the Syrian opposition, their armed activities have been accused of 
mismanagement and a lack of coordination.(10) It is unlikely that rebel groups’ capacities or 
motivations for coordinated service delivery outstrip their capacities for combat. But in opposition-
held areas, the psychology of the “spirit of revolution” informs and strengthens identities and the 
armed struggle against the regime, and staff there feel duty-bound to assist civilian populations.(11) 
The interim councils in Syria occupy a mutable area with respect to the literature on failed 
and weak states, and could be more accurately characterized as areas of limited statehood that 
function under intensely challenging conditions. Krasner and Risse note that “we know surprisingly 
little about…public service provision in areas of limited statehood…There is no linear relationship 
between service provision and the level of statehood or state capacity in areas of limited 
statehood.”(12) The exact nature of the relationship between interim councils and civilians in their 
territories is not well known, however much they claim to represent civilians’ rights, and gathering 
data on such a sensitive topic in situ would be impossible. However, it is possible to identify three 
interacting aspects of the social contract(13) in operation in rebel-held areas of Syria: the capacity of 
the state to deliver services (severely hampered), its political will to do so (often claimed as one goal 
of the revolution), and the expectations of citizens towards the state (currently unknown in any detail).  
The Core Humanitarian Standards on Quality and Accountability,(14) the Grand Bargain(15) 
and the Humanitarian Accountability Report 2015(16) all call for greater recognition of the lead role of 
local organizations in humanitarian contexts. While Syria’s interim councils are not humanitarian 
organizations as such, they nevertheless fulfil many of the fundamental provisions of such agencies in 
supplying water, food and healthcare, which is particularly noticeable in the absence or limited 
presence of international actors. 
For opposition-held areas of Syria, the issue of legitimacy is significant, particularly in 
relation to external actors’ rationale for withholding or providing support to the interim councils. It is 
unclear to what extent the opposition interim councils are providing basic services in order to bolster 
their legitimacy. Previous research indicates that armed groups fighting the state can increase 
legitimacy and local support through providing services and publicizing their humanitarian 
credentials,(17) and decrease the chance of spoiling (refusal to negotiate) and insurrection.(18) Insurgent 
organizations’ delivery of healthcare and social services increases the recruitment of other 
militants.(19) However, Brinkerhoff et al.(20) find a complex, non-linear relationship between perceived 
legitimacy and service delivery in fragile and conflict-affected states. Overall, there is no scholarly 
consensus on exactly how improved service delivery correlates with state legitimacy.(21) 
Mcloughlin(22) emphasizes citizens’ own perceptions of the functions and activities of basic service 
providers, and recommends a broad understanding of both legitimacy and service delivery. While 
opposition parties that also provide services have a greater chance of being involved in negotiations to 
end hostilities, and those negotiations have a greater chance of being stable,(23) this does not 
necessarily mean that the interim councils provide services as a bargaining tool to strengthen their 
post-conflict position. 
There are precedents in Syria for the politicized withholding of basic services. Even before 
the civil war, the national government used the targeted provision of goods and services, particularly 
electricity, as a key mechanism to ensure political control and reward political loyalty.(24) The extent 
to which this pattern of favouritism may be replicated in opposition-held areas is not well understood.  
Due to the highly politicized nature of international intervention in the Syrian conflict, there 
has been a lack of consolidated external engagement with the interim governance structures in 
opposition-held areas or recognition of the services they provide. The various actors in the 
international community have been unable to investigate or agree on the legal status of these 
structures. The interim council service providers therefore currently fall into a grey area: neither 
clearly state nor non-state, and not distinctly part of any state-building processes. This absence of 
international intervention or support occurs despite the stated humanitarian imperative: that saving 
lives in the short-term should take precedence over solving complex political conflicts. By conflating 
armed insurgents with service providers, and humanitarian interventions with political and military 
interventions, the international community has missed numerous opportunities to adhere to any sort of 
humanitarian prioritization.  
International policy discourse on these sensitive topics has been greatly influenced by the 
security focus of combatting terrorism and preventing extremists from taking power in Syrian 
territory. While the international community remains unsure what action to take, civilians and interim 
council staff are subject to the deliberate targeting of non-combatants and use of proscribed weapons. 
As a member of one discussion group states, “the regime, Russia and Iran are bombing everything: 
schools, hospitals, Civil Defence, and use internationally banned weapons: bombs, napalm and 
cluster bombs and do not abide by any international charters”.(25)  
 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
The data for this paper come from 16 anonymous interviews and three focus group discussions with 
senior staff from Local Council offices and medical staff in four urban areas at the time held by 
opposition forces. (These were primarily in Aleppo and Eastern Ghouta; supplementary data were 
gathered in Madaya and Darayya. These latter three locations are all in the Damascus region.) The 
interviews were carried out in mid-2016 for a research project on Syrian first responders(26) by 
researchers from Afaq Academy, a Syrian advocacy and research organization headquartered in 
Gaziantep, Turkey, with support from the humanitarian organization Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 
and analysed by staff from Coventry University. The research framework was collaboratively 
designed by the three partners and the interview questions discussed extensively before data collection 
started. The partners agreed to focus on the perceptions of service personnel rather than civilians, 
given the specialized nature of the intended questions. Afaq Academy researchers were already 
engaged under a previous NPA project in Syria (“Conflict Preparedness and Protection”) and were 
experienced in data collection and storage, security protocols, information management and personal 
protection measures. The project management entailed particular challenges of coordination and 
reporting due to the extreme insecurity and the imperative to preserve the anonymity of both 
respondents and researchers. 
Since the data were collected, the security situation in Syria has changed significantly in some 
areas, including Aleppo after it was retaken by regime forces. Information in the interviews therefore 
represents a “snapshot” of events and conditions at that time. All interviewees are referred to by code 
to prevent their identification. (A detailed examination of the ethics, difficulties of translation and 
objectivity, and data collection constraints in besieged areas is contained in the report on first 
responders.(27)) The scope of this paper extends only to findings from interim council and medical 
staff in opposition-held territories, and not from regime-held areas. We could not interview any 
recipients of basic services, due to the sensitivity of the data and potential security risks.  
Groups on all sides of the conflict are accused of flouting international humanitarian law, 
committing human rights abuses and preventing civilians from accessing basic services. These groups 
include the regime and its allies and the various armed factions fighting them and each other. It was 
thus important during the research to avoid references to blame, right and wrong, civil war genesis 
and cessation, and so on, and to focus on service delivery and support to civilians. The questions from 
the open-ended interviews and focus groups addressed the scope and nature of work being 
undertaken, particular challenges beyond the ongoing insecurity, coordination issues, partners and 
networks, sources of support, organizational strengths, changes the respondents would like to see, and 
training and equipment requested. The researchers had considerable autonomy to pose additional 
questions as appropriate, but questions challenging opposition staff or opinions voiced in support of 
the regime would have compromised access to respondents. Data collection, then, had to balance the 
potential for objective rigour and an unbiased overview with the opportunity to obtain insights into the 
experiences and opinions of respondents in their own words. All quotations from interview 
respondents are given in italics. 
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF SERVICE PROVISION IN THE OPPOSITION-HELD 
TERRITORIES  
 
A document(28) partly translated into English from the Ministry of Local Administration, Relief and 
Refugees (MOLARR) of the Syrian Interim Government provides insight into the organizational 
structure of the interim Local Councils. The three primary sets of stakeholders for provision of basic 
services are: 
 
 Military: Militias on the ground of various factions, sizes and affiliations; these are 
considered to be highly significant for work progress. 
 Civil: Complements basic services and local coordination, including the Governorate Council 
and its different bureaus, including: Relief, Service, Media, and Legal. 
 Medical: Active medical associations. 
 
The interim Local Councils in opposition areas generally follow an organizational structure 
comprising seven separate bureaus under the leadership of the General Services Directorate, or 
General Authority (Figure 1). 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1] 
 
A wide range of interim government sectors address aspects of service provision, including 
several non-military elements, although armed groups are listed first by MOLARR. The mechanisms 
of coordination and leadership across these various groups are contested and changing, and the 
numbers and types of civilians needing basic services in opposition-held urban areas are not 
representative of pre-conflict demographics. Those in dire need – the injured, disabled, chronically 
sick, elderly and children – far exceed the comparable peacetime numbers. Many younger able-bodied 
people have fled or been killed, and so service provision for this vastly altered demographic has to 
focus on emergency requirements and the needs of highly vulnerable individuals. 
MOLARR identifies five priority areas of service provision: food, relief, services, medical, 
and education.(29) All these offices report to the Local Council, which is itself under the province 
office (General Authority) and supervises multiple councils to ensure coordination and quality. One 
council staff member states, “the province office is considered the mother organization for all Local 
Councils, it supervises and coordinates the work”.(30) Another says, “like the rest of the Local 
Councils in Eastern Ghouta, we are responsible for administrative, service and relief regulations”.(31) 
For staff selection, the same council member clarifies, “after the head of the Local Council 
has been elected in coordination with the General Authority, he has to choose the offices’ managers 
who run the service, relief, educational work and others”.(32) The isolating effects of the conflict, 
whereby opposition-held areas are geographically separated, prevents large-scale programme 
implementation and consolidated delivery mechanisms. Service provision is undertaken in short 
timeframes and at a small scale. What follows is an overview of MOLARR’s five priority areas of 
service provision.  
 
a. Food 
 
The shortage of food, especially nutritious food, is a major challenge in the besieged areas. Staples 
such as wheat flour can be locally produced, stored and distributed, but there is a severe lack of 
specialized foodstuffs like baby milk that need to be produced in a factory: “we suffer from a lack 
of… food for children and infant formula”(33) and “we need children milk, vitamins and food 
improvers [sic] for babies”.(34) Children are repeatedly described as the primary victims of food 
shortages: “[due to] the ongoing war, many mothers and children suffer from malnutrition”.(35) Food 
availability and supply varies significantly across locations, and one doctor states that “there was no 
healthy food for the patients, for breakfast we gave them only jam, while for lunch we offered them 
rice or couscous”.(36) Yet the same doctor claims that “we offer the patients all that they need from 
food, drinks and medicine in these difficult conditions, from the moment after their operation until the 
end of the period of treatment…whether it is a day, a week or even a month”.(37) 
The production and storage of nutritious but perishable foodstuffs like vegetables and fruit is 
highly problematic: “We don’t have any kind of healthy food or vegetables….People are eating 
unhealthy foods”(38) and “During the siege there is no healthy food for the [hospital] patients…even 
bread is impossible to obtain and there are no vegetables in the markets. Then what can we offer 
them?”(39) One Local Council member highlights the importance of safe storage: “Under this siege, 
we have to store more essential food supplies for at least three months. Unfortunately, people do not 
have enough money to buy this food and store it.”(40)  
Price gouging appears widespread: “The majority of people are unemployed. Traders, 
unfortunately, are taking advantage of the situation and have increased the prices.”(41) The medical 
staff discussion group concludes, “after the siege, our choices and sources in food became very 
limited and it is very expensive for locals”.(42) Pessimism is evident in discussions about food: 
“civilians cannot protect themselves because there are no basic things of life, such as food”.(43) In 
response to the inflated costs, the Economic Office “buys food commodities and sell them to the 
people at a cheaper price up to 60 per cent”.(44) In response to funding shortages, the Local Council 
undertakes to “cultivate and reap crops and sell them so that we can cover the council expenses and 
distribute profits to the townspeople at a fixed rate per month”,(45) and various local agricultural 
projects supply additional foodstuffs.(46) However much the de facto local government assists in 
supplying food, civilians run a risk while obtaining it as “they still need to go outside to secure their 
daily needs for food”.(47) One discussion group of Local Council staff mentions their distribution of 
food baskets to displaced people, presumably from other opposition areas, who are referred to as 
“guests in our town”.(48)  
 
b. Relief 
 
The Relief Office claims to distribute “relief baskets” impartially to recipients “without considering 
whether they are rich or poor”,(49) but “has great difficulty getting aid for displaced people…because 
the goods are really expensive”.(50) It is not clear what is contained in these relief baskets. 
Supplying potable water is a major challenge: “We need heavy equipment for electricity and 
water projects. We need spare parts necessary for water.” (51) “Another challenge is…finding sterile 
water.” (52) “[We] the council failed in digging more water wells to overcome the issue of water 
shortage.” (53)  
A member of another council reports that “we need a lot of equipment and lighting...Water 
shortage is another challenge, we rely on well water…The main water network does not work in our 
town due to the lack of pumps and the destruction of a large section of the pipes and plumbing...”(54) It 
is not clear to what extent respondents distinguish relief activities from service activities, or how 
much these services reflect MOLARR’s priority areas. 
 
c. Services 
 
The Service Office deals with debris, street cleaning and drinking water supply. “It provides the 
heavy machineries and equipment to clear rubble, bring fresh water to the town, drill wells and install 
compressors to extract water that is used only for cleaning because the water of the town is 
contaminated and undrinkable.”(55) Several respondents refer to the need for additional water 
pumps,(56) and medical staff experience “difficulties providing the patients with filtered water in the 
case of water cuts”.(57) As one group explains, obtaining medically sterile water is a considerable 
challenge,(58) and requires careful coordination between the Local Council and Medical Offices.(59) 
Water is also required for growing crops: “we need to…dig channels to bring sanitation water to 
irrigate the agricultural lands”.(60)  
Discussions of water shortages are often accompanied by simultaneous references to the lack 
of fuel and electricity, and respondents are highly aware of the interlocking relationship between these 
services. One Local Council, for instance, explains that the high price of fuel has left it deprived of 
electricity for five years, which means it relies on well water, as wells do not require electricity for 
pumping.(61) Council members identify the need to “provide electricity for the citizens who are paying 
exorbitant amounts for only three hours a day”.(62) As one group of medical workers laments, “we 
lack medicines and medical tools…but there is something else more important which is fuel. How can 
we continue without electricity all the time?”(63) One project researcher reports that the group meeting 
was held “in very cold and frozen weather in front of a wood fireplace”(64) due to a lack of alternative 
fuel.  
Another major operational challenge is clearing rubble, which blocks access and compounds 
the difficulties of finding survivors after shelling incidents. Heavy equipment is lacking, although the 
Local Council staff can sometimes borrow diggers from the Civil Defence. “The Service Office 
provides heavy machineries and equipment that help us to raise the rubble, bring fresh water to the 
town, drill wells and install compressors to extract water.”(65) Due to the intensity of the fighting, 
“our office had new responsibilities and started to clear the rubble and prepare basements and 
shelters to protect the rest of the people who stayed in the town”.(66) One council worker claims that 
“we prepare underground houses to achieve the necessary protection for everybody inside the 
town”.(67) To enable surviving buildings to protect and accommodate more people, “we have to 
strengthen the ground floors…with layers of soil bags”.(68) As a result of the destruction, “there are 
families living in houses that are not suitable…unfit even [for] livestock in other countries”.(69) 
 
d. Medical 
 
Newborns, children, lactating mothers and pregnant women have urgent medical and nutritional 
needs. Vitamins, children’s supplements and baby milk are all desperately required, as well as many 
medicines and drugs. “We suffer from intense shortages of drugs and vaccines and we do not have 
medical clinics…this situation in the town caused specialist clinics to close and move to safer places 
outside the town, causing troubles for all civilians.”(70) Yet information can be inconsistent; according 
to the director of one Medical Office, “the clinic section consists of three clinics, well-equipped with 
the best medical equipment where doctors work in shifts covering all 7 days a week within a 
recognized programme agreed between all the medical centres, which include 10 specialists such as 
internal medicine, gastroenterology, children, women, bones, hernia, chest, general surgery, skin and 
physiotherapy.”(71) He also refers to the “free pharmacy which issues more than 700 types of medicine 
to patients free of charge”.(72)  
The Medical Office “distributes milk cans to children from time to time”(73) and coordinates 
closely with the Civil Defence units. For patient transport, “the Medical Office has an ambulance that 
transfers the wounded to hospital during shelling [and] is used by people…to transfer their family 
members to clinics when necessary”.(74) Medical staff advise against focussing entirely on emergency 
medicine. For example, dentistry is also much needed, along with other non-emergency treatments, 
such as for hypertension and other chronic ailments. Staff also express concern over the health 
impacts of living conditions: “refugees live in underground houses in nearby towns, so we advise 
them to take their children outside and expose them to sunrays…to prevent asthma, shortness of 
breath and other diseases”.(75) However, emergency life-saving interventions are inevitably 
prioritized: “…we work in the calm days when there are just one or two raids by…warplanes or a few 
artillery shells, but when there is a significant escalation on the area, the hospital stops all operations 
and all the doctors and nurses mobilize to rescue the wounded people”.(76)  
In Eastern Ghouta, the Unified Medical Office has drawn up a schedule for doctors to work in 
different hospitals and medical points, facilitating coordination. A doctor refers to experience gained 
during the years of siege: “we have a distinct medical staff and nurses who have long experience 
gained through revolution time [sic], which spanned five years. Most nurses in the hospital have been 
practicing this career since the beginning of the revolution so now they have a considerable 
experience in surgery and dealing with cases of amputations.”(77) Another doctor has a less optimistic 
view: “We need to increase the training of nurses so that they can work better to compensate for the 
absence of experienced doctors”,(78) as many of the trained doctors have fled or been killed. A doctor 
in another health centre likewise states, “We seek to add an emergency section…to develop nurses’ 
expertise”.(79) 
In terms of patient type (civilian or rebel), one Medical Office mentions that “we receive 
both, because the attacks do not distinguish between civilians and armed people and we, as a medical 
aid organization, see our human duty to receive all, not to receive some and refuse others on the basis 
of their political party or whether they are armed or not”.(80) 
 
e. Education 
 
Bombing has almost totally destroyed the existing schools in the besieged areas, and this lack of 
physical facilities dominates discussions about education in the besieged areas. “We replaced 
[schools] with basements and apartments...They need a lot of equipment and lighting, which we are 
working to provide.”(81) As in other sectors, staff routinely work on an almost voluntary basis: “The 
Education Office in the Local Council is responsible for providing all the supplies to…the only school 
in the town…[whose] teachers are sometimes given symbolic salaries”. The Directorate of Education 
in Damascus Countryside Province “provides a portion of the teachers’ salaries working in the town's 
schools”(82) and “provides school supplies like stationery”.(83) A Local Council member explains, 
“We would like to develop the Education Office since it is the basis of the progress and 
development.” (84) In one town, all the schools have ceased to function except one, which now has 
over 1,500 pupils.(85) 
One of the doctors, discussing the lamentable state of educational provision, says, “What is 
being implemented at school is only letting children play…without any real benefit”.(86) One Local 
Council member explains, “a large number of students drop out of school as a result of the harsh 
conditions of war and because parents fear to send their children to schools. In addition, there is a 
problem of child labour for school students whose circumstances forced them to leave school for a 
living.”(87) The accountant from one local NGO suggests that “education and protection projects [are 
more] important at this time than relief projects, [as] many organizations are working in…relief”.(88) 
Several interviewees explain that adult education is also required, especially for sector-specific 
training such as first aid.   
 
V. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION 
 
The interviews overall suggest a significant level of coordination between different sector offices, 
along with the need to strengthen it. Given the lack of physical access and damage to 
telecommunications infrastructure, the coordination, at whatever level, across different sectors and 
between different offices is striking. This may be a reflection of the shared revolutionary spirit and the 
will to work together efficiently. Specific to Aleppo, “MOLARR established an emergency operation 
room with the participation of the Local Council [and] Assistance Coordination Unit… defining the 
essential needs and [to] secure a strategic stockpile of these needs to be sufficient for six months to 
face this potential siege and its consequences.”(89)  
The closest coordination is in the medical sector, between different hospitals and medical 
posts: “there is a high coordination between all hospitals and medical points operating in Al-Ghouta, 
whether they are charitable, military or civilian”.(90) Another senior doctor explains, “we coordinate 
with other medical centres to see if they can give service to the patient. If one of the centres can, we 
transfer the patient to them. If not, we coordinate with the armed political parties to send them to the 
western sector [or] the patient can go to the capital under his own personal responsibility.”(91) As 
well, “The Ambulance Department in the hospital in coordination with the Civil Defence Department 
and the medical points operating in the hospital divided the area into sectors so that the ambulance 
system in the hospital is responsible for evacuating the wounded ones and the search for survivors 
under the rubble according to each specified area.”(92)  
“There is full cooperation in the process of referring patients because we have sections that 
[other hospitals] do not have and vice versa. This process and connection is between all the 
administrative and medical staff.”(93) Doctors working in medical points “coordinate with medical 
centres to organize training and workshops”.(94)  
There is similarly close operational coordination between the medical teams and the Civil 
Defence teams. One doctor highlights that “we consider [the Civil Defence] as complementary 
members of our work and we build a special relationship with them”.(95) A council member says, “the 
Medical Office cooperates directly with the neighbouring medical points and the Civil Defence 
point”.(96)  
There are repeated mentions of the close working relations among medical services, Local 
Councils and armed groups. One doctor explains how “we document the names of patients, wounded, 
martyrs, number of visits...we do the documentation and data and send them to the Unified Medical 
Office in Eastern Ghouta”.(97) A Local Council representative explains how the staff coordinate “with 
Civil Defence centres and with the medical centres that are near the town to receive the injured…we 
also coordinate with medical centres of military factions because the town became the frontline and 
all factions have service ambulances and frankly, all factions help us and their cars are always under 
service and their nurses are alert to serve civilians during direct bombing”.(98) Another Local Council 
representative makes the same claim: “As for local organizations, we work with the Civil Defence 
forces, opposition parties, medical providers, and free police…to monitor the prices at the local 
market, we get in touch with opposition brigades… [and] the Civil Defence when we need to remove 
rubble.”(99)  
The interview respondents express frustration with armed opposition groups, but also refer to 
their charitable behaviour: “The rebels controlled the fodder store…and sold its contents and gave the 
money to the Board of Trustees who have distributed…money to the people, in addition they built a 
school and medical dispensary [equipped] with first aid equipment and paid the salaries of the 
dispensary medical cadres. The rest of the money was given to the Economic Office that supplies the 
town’s agricultural projects with the necessary equipment.”(100) 
 
VI. SPECIFIC CHALLENGES  
 
All respondents refer to repeated bombardment and the routine danger of death, but the siege 
conditions give rise to extreme operational constraints beyond the physical insecurity. Work 
challenges result from a lack of staff, destroyed infrastructure, transport difficulties and equipment 
shortages, as well as weak standing capacity of staff. Storage of goods and equipment is highly 
problematic, and there are huge fluctuations in availability of materials and foodstuffs. This leads to 
widespread use of provisional substitutes and improvisation, for instance with heaters, generator fuel 
and furniture. Secure protected warehouses for foods and other goods are lacking. Constructing them 
in scattered locations puts them less at risk, but compounds problems of access and delivery. Many 
respondents explain that they store items underground, which adds damp to other problems.(101) 
Machinery suffers from a lack of spare parts and fuel, and the need to reuse, repair and improvise is 
repeatedly mentioned.(102) Regarding the need to “establish enormous projects like preparing water 
networks and huge electrical generators to bring electricity for civilians”,(103) under current 
circumstances this is completely impossible and would only be feasible in an environment with a 
minimum of basic security established.  
There is a severe lack of specialist medical staff, medical equipment and drugs, especially 
vaccines. Staff in one hospital explain that their main doctor was originally trained as a veterinarian 
and their two dentists have not graduated.(104) “We suffer from a severe shortage of…sterilizers, 
gauze, serums, balms and ambulatory supplies…but more important is fuel.” (105) “We are using the 
bed covers and pillows, because bandages are not available.”(106) “We have appealed [for] full 
vaccinations for children because they are not a party in the war.”(107)   
Interim Council workers are paid irregularly and receive little remuneration, but in the 
besieged areas there is little paid work of any type. “Our workers receive only symbolic salaries.”(108) 
One fully trained doctor states, “since I was hired there has been no fixed salary…And it is always 
decreasing.”(109) “The head of the Local Council and…all the office managers in the council…are all 
working hard and free of charge to serve the people of the town.”(110) In many offices, people perform 
work they were not trained to do: “Inexperienced technical staff means we have to perform work 
that’s not within our duties.”(111) Cross-sectoral specialists are needed, particularly to develop medical 
skills such as first aid among the council staff: “We seek to send young clerks… to medical courses in 
specialist hospitals and emergency centres.”(112)  
Although some small-scale international support does exist, respondents often refer to feeling 
totally unsupported and abandoned by the international community: “There is no real international 
body that supports us”,(113) “nobody supports us”(114) and “Our Local Council suffers – like other 
councils do – from the lack of support.” (115) In many interviews the respondents’ despondency and 
pessimism are tangible, not only due to day-to-day difficulties and dangers, but from the sense of 
being ignored by the rest of the world.   
While most interviewees refer to their coordination as a strength, the lack of communications 
is highlighted as a constraint. “We need to find more effective ways to increase the communication 
between the council and its customers…[to respond to] customer’s complaints quicker and more 
seriously....We need to further our internal monitoring...[we need] quicker response and better 
communication between staff and officials…they have poor technical performance due to poor 
communication [which] impacted the performance of the council.”(116) Wi-Fi is sporadically available, 
but normally “we face the challenge of non-availability of the internet”(117) and “[our office] does not 
have modern communication equipment”.(118) “We suffer from difficulty of moving and 
communication…90% of the roads are out of use…During this difficult siege, we suffer big difficulties 
bringing medical equipment that the Medical Office needs.”(119)  
 
VII. “WHAT CHANGES WOULD YOU LIKE TO SEE IN YOUR WORK?”  
 
This interview question produced some of the most interesting responses. All respondents focus 
primarily on the cessation of hostilities, but many also refer to coordination and improved 
collaborative working practices. Other key responses draw attention to professional anxieties. 
Feelings of inadequacy and distress about the limitations on their work are palpable and emotionally 
wrought. “This is a huge question and you can write whatever you think… in such non-normal [sic] 
circumstances where everything is difficult.”(120)  
A focus group of Local Council staff produced several suggestions: “[We need] effective 
cooperation among all medical institutions…implementation and support of joint service projects… 
the media to effectively coordinate and unify their efforts…Dialogue and cultural sessions to increase 
people’s awareness…We would like to modernize and develop work mechanisms [and] records to 
know all of our data.” (121) Another Local Council representative emphasized the need for improved 
inter-agency collaboration: “We need to have good and effective coordination with all the internal 
offices [and] with civil society organizations and other institutions working in the…besieged 
areas.”(122) 
“We want to have administrative coordination between the Local Council members and other 
revolutionary institutions to improve the work…we need to establish new projects that enable us to 
achieve self-sufficiency during this blockade and the high prices.”(123) Similarly, “we need to develop 
the work through increasing the coordination with all the revolutionary activities”.(124) Medical 
providers refer to the need for improved “specialization in work, and separating administration and 
financial work”.(125) 
Respondents repeatedly highlight the importance of learning from other urban areas and other 
professional sectors to develop their own work and organizational capabilities: “We aspire to have 
high coordinating [sic] with hospitals and Medical Offices in other liberated provinces to take 
advantage of their expertise…to develop ourselves with the benefit of their experience.”(126) “[We 
require] human and administrative development courses…in our town.”(127) “…to develop the 
administrative, financial, media and medical sector in the council”.(128) “…to modernize and develop 
the mechanisms of our work”.(129) “We hope to get technical and financial support to develop 
ourselves.”(130)“We hope that the international community takes civilians out [of] the conflict, brings 
the necessary medicine, achieves the modern medical devices…which help us treating the 
civilians.”(131) 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Service provision under urban siege in Syria is an extreme case, but provides insights into government 
activities in an emergency setting, particularly at the municipal level. This conflict forces a re-
examination of basic service provision in urban areas in the context of enormous deprivation. What 
regulatory and support frameworks should be developed to facilitate service provision in the future, 
and how can impartial humanitarian support be kept separate from the politics of civil conflict? More 
empirical investigations are required on the emergence of alternate governance structures in conflict, 
how they approach and implement service delivery, and the range of non-state actors’ roles(132) in 
these processes.  
Despite research limitations in this environment, and even assuming that the responses we 
have are guarded, some key findings emerge from this investigation. Firstly, there is little indication 
that basic service delivery in the besieged opposition-held areas is undertaken primarily to increase 
local legitimacy, or to strengthen the position for post-conflict negotiation. These may be implicit 
aspects of the work, but are not discussed as explicit objectives. The range of activities currently 
undertaken to deliver basic services of various types are presented as more process- than goal-
oriented. The provision of external support to Syria’s service providers should reflect this fact.  
Interestingly, none of the interviewees refer to how local people perceive them or the work 
they perform. They seem to assume that local governance and service provision are perceived as 
taking place in partnership with the armed struggle. The responses often come across as earnest and 
somewhat idealistic. Both interview respondents and key informants outside Syria(133) present service 
provision for besieged civilians as an integral part of their revolutionary struggle.  Yet this is coupled 
with intense weariness of the continued violence and destruction of life.  
The need for improved inter-agency coordination and communications is mentioned 
frequently, second only to the need to stop the war. The medical centres and hospitals report closer 
collaboration than other sectors, but there are repeated references to the need for better coordination 
among armed groups, Civil Defence, interim councils and medical workers. The available data 
suggest that a reactive, responsive approach to service provision is widespread; respondents seldom 
refer to any contingency planning or preparedness measures to ensure continued provision of key 
services. 
Given the illegality of urban siege as a weapon of war, the belligerents are unlikely to listen to 
calls for humanitarian access. But emergency service provision should be distinguished from attempts 
to cease political conflict. Although many respondents claim to receive no international support, 
others are aware of external financial assistance, particularly from Gulf state donors and international 
INGOs. Some institutions report having several donors, and others report having none. Staff morale 
would be strengthened if they felt more supported internationally, and if this support could be more 
standardized and equitable.  
Given the manifold difficulties of providing basic services under such conditions, it may be 
unrealistic to suggest mechanisms to improve it. But some requests from interview respondents can be 
highlighted. They recommend that mitigation be approached at a communal level, with multiple 
sectors and stakeholders involved in the planning process. Sustainable and appropriate initiatives such 
as household agriculture and water storage could be encouraged to promote self-sufficiency. There are 
multiple requests from staff to develop their skills in human resources, administration and 
organizational management, and for better cooperation between civilian offices. Particularly at the 
city or municipal level, external assistance could be facilitated to support service providers while 
maintaining some neutrality from political efforts to halt the conflict. 
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